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2. SITUATION IN THAILAND

Comment on:



The possibility that violence may follow the recent resignations from the Thai cabinet appears to be waning. Marshal Sarit, the most influential of the four resigning ministers, has reiterated his "loyalty" to Premier Phibun and promised that there will be no "reaction" to his resignation as defense minister "so long as I remain commander in chief of the army." Phibun also assured the press that there would be no coup d'etat and announced that the cabinet would soon meet to consider replacements for the outgoing ministers.

Although prospects of a coup d'etat seem to be subsiding, there have been reports that Sarit is being encouraged by his supporters and by opposition elements to bolt the government party and attempt to bring down Phibun by parliamentary means. Many officers presumably loyal to Sarit are appointive members of parliament. Earlier efforts this summer by the Sarit camp to develop a strong parliamentary coalition, however, failed to make much headway against Phibun's majority. (SECRET)

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
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4. INDONESIAN ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF RESIGNS

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The Indonesian army announced on 21 August that the third deputy chief of staff, Colonel Dahlan Djambek, had resigned from the army. Although no reason was given for his action, Djambek is reported to have been an agent in Djakarta for the disaffected Central Sumatran governing council and an opponent of the policies of the army chief of staff, General Nasution. He was arrested on 11 July for meeting with a group of Sumatrans, but was released the following day.

Comment

President Sukarno reportedly has been contemplating major command changes which would affect General Nasution and some of his deputies. Army headquarters officers are generally anti-Communist and several of them have appeared sympathetic to the views of the disaffected commanders.

Djambek's resignation may well be the beginning of significant command changes which could result in increased Communist influence in the army. It may also jeopardize Premier Djuanda's plans to hold a round-table conference with dissident leaders early next month. (NOFORN)

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ANNEX

Watch Report 368, 22 August 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Although the deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East in the immediate future is unlikely, tensions stemming from recent developments in Syria and unstable conditions, particularly in Jordan, have increased the possibilities for conflict in the area.

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